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Abstract 
The paper makes an attempt to examine systematically the capabilities for software production 
in a latecomer context and to propose an approach for analysing the technological capabilities 
(TC) in a latecomer software industry. Taking the analysis one step further than identifying 
capabilities, the study introduces the notion of coherence of TC and suggests that in analysing 
the TC the analysis needs to take into account also the coherence among the capabilities. The 
analysis of the accumulation of individual TC in the Bulgarian software industry reveals that 
significant differences emerge between the TC of domestic-oriented vs. the export-driven 
companies. The analysis of the coherence of TC proves capable of disentangling the deeper 
disparities in the accumulation of capabilities and it reveals that strong coherence occurs only in 
‘export’ TC. The paper concludes by bringing back the discussion about the prospects and the 
entry strategies for developing latecomer software industries. Based on the results the study 
contests the ‘walking on two legs’ hypothesis and also points that the optimistic forecasts about 
the possibilities for leapfrogging by the latecomer countries by developing indigenous software 
industries have been overestimated.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the last two decades a group of studies has been emphasising that the information 
technologies (ITs) present a ‘window of opportunities’ for latecomer countries to catch-up by 
developing indigenous software industries (Soete, 1985; Steinmueller, 2001). It has been 
outlined that the availability of skilful human capital creates a solid base for development of an 
IT industry by the latecomers. The software industry is, in principle, low-capital but knowledge 
and skill-intensive industry, and the international market for software is big and growing 
(OECD, 2004; Steinmueller, 2004). For this reason, the discussion about developing indigenous 
software industries in the latecomer context has gained particular attention both in academic and 
policy literature for more than a decade (Schware, 1989, 1992; Soete, 1985; Steinmueller, 2001; 
UNIDO, 1988).  
However, developing a software industry in a latecomer or less-advanced context is not a 
straightforward task. To be successful and sustainable in time the development of the industry 
needs to involve accumulation of technological capabilities. Technological capabilities for 
software development are difficult to accumulate in a latecomer context, and the difficulties 
arise from the very nature of technological knowledge and the complexity of the learning 
process in a latecomer context. The success in building capabilities depends entirely on the 
latecomer companies’ deliberate efforts to upgrade, and in this sense, development of 
technological capabilities is a challenge for the latecomers. Very few latecomer companies have 
managed to enter the international markets and this fact amplifies the need to scrutinise the 
technological capabilities, which the companies have been able to develop.  
Despite the significance, which has been prescribed to the development of indigenous software 
industries in the latecomer context, the question of what types of technological capabilities the 
indigenous latecomer software companies need to develop, to be able to compete on 
international markets, has not been addressed systematically in the literature so far.  
The discussion about capabilities building can be traced back to the seminal works of Schware 
(1989; 1992), Correa (1996) and Heeks (2002), which were discussing the entry strategies for 
latecomer software industries. Despite their mentioning of capabilities as an important driver in 
this development, neither of the studies provides a framework for analysing capabilities in a 
latecomer software industry.  
The recent spectacular outbursts of software development activities undertaken by indigenous 
software industries in a number of developing countries, like India, China and Brazil, have 
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attracted particular attention for research (see for example among many others, for all latecomer 
countries (Arora, 2005; Carmel, 2003; Heeks, 2002; Minevich, 2005), for India (Arora, 2001; 
Athreye, 2005; Tschang, 2001), for China (Tschang, 2005), for China vs. India (Contractor, 
2004; Tschang, 2003), for Brazil (Botelho, 2005). Some analyses have mentioned capabilities as 
an important driver in the latecomer software industries development, but few of them had 
positioned the discussion in the context of technological capabilities building and few of them 
had attempted to provide analytical framework for investigating capabilities in a latecomer 
software industry. Those that did so did not achieve adequate outcomes, as the review in section 
4 reveals.   
This paper attempts to address the abovementioned gaps in the existing body of literature by 
positioning the discussion about development of a latecomer software industry within the 
existing literature in the field of technological development in the latecomer context. The aim of 
the paper is to suggest an approach for analysing technological capabilities in a latecomer 
software industry, taking into account its specifics. The focal points of the analysis are only the 
capabilities for software production in a latecomer context, while the rest of the capabilities will 
be presented in further research. Further, the paper introduces the notion of coherence of 
technological capabilities, which has not been done in the literature so far.  It argues that if we 
are to make a comprehensive account of the technological capabilities building, the analysis 
needs to explore not only the accumulation of individual capabilities but also the level of 
coherence of technological capabilities.   
The paper is structured as follows. The following section 2 makes an overview of the concept of 
technological capabilities building. Section 3 presents taxonomy of technological capabilities 
and introduces the notion of coherence of technological capabilities. Section 4 disentangles the 
specifics of studying the technological capabilities building in a latecomer software industry and 
makes an attempt to examine systematically the technological capabilities, which the latecomer 
software companies need to develop. The analysis in section 5 explores the accumulation of 
individual technological capabilities in the domestic-oriented vs. the export-driven companies. 
Section 6 investigates the level of coherence of the ‘domestic’ vs. the ‘export’ technological 
capabilities. The final section 7 concludes by bringing back the debate about prospects for 
development of latecomer software industries and outlines directions for further research. 
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2. THE CONCEPT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES BUILDING 
It has been acknowledged that to be successful and sustainable over time the technological 
development in a latecomer or less-advanced context needs to involve technological capabilities 
building (Bell, 1993; Ernst, 1998; Hobday, 1995; Kim, 2000; Lall, 1992). Technological 
capabilities building involve a deliberate process of learning and technology upgrading by the 
latecomer companies directed at the accumulation of knowledge and skills and their commercial 
application.  
Being the driving force in the process of technology upgrading in the latecomer companies, the 
accumulation of technological capabilities deserves considerable attention for understanding the 
complexity in the process of technological development in the latecomer context.  
The technological capabilities can be defined as ‘the great variety of knowledge and skills 
which firms need so that they can acquire, assimilate, use, adapt, change and create technology’ 
(Ernst, et al, 1998, p. 17). 
In defining the technological capabilities the studies encompass the wide array of skills and 
abilities, which the latecomers need to build in order to develop mastery over the new 
technologies. These involve the capabilities to acquire and use new technologies, but also, and 
more importantly, the capabilities to generate innovation to a certain degree – from generation 
of incremental change and modification in acquired technologies to introducing new 
technologies (Bell, 1993; Ernst, 1998; Marcelle, 2004).  
Building technological capabilities is by no means a passive, mechanistic or automatic process. 
Rather, it is a deliberate process of learning and accumulation of various knowledge and skills, 
and their combination, in attempt to develop mastery over the new technologies (Bell, 1993; 
Ernst, 1998; Hobday, 1995, 2000; Kim, 1997). The initiation of a process of technological 
capabilities building comes as a result of a deliberate learning effort by the latecomer companies 
aimed at technological upgrading. Building upon a foundation of production experience, a 
further set of skills and capabilities are required for companies to embark on a technological 
capabilities building trajectory. Building knowledge and understanding about modern 
technologies is a cumulative, firm-specific and context-specific process, and it requires 
accumulation of tacit and codified knowledge, in order to develop mastery over new 
technologies (Dosi, 1988; Pavitt, 1987). This makes the process of technological capabilities 
building in a latecomer context and the development of ‘higher level’ technological capabilities 
particularly difficult. 
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Studies (Bell, 1993; Figueiredo, 2001; Hobday, 2000; Kim, 1997) have emphasised that it is 
crucial to distinguish between production and innovative capabilities, as these reflect completely 
different set of accumulated skills by the latecomer companies. Developing production 
capabilities involve accumulating skills and abilities to operate new technologies, while building 
innovative capabilities is a far more cumbersome task. To build innovative capabilities the 
latecomers need to deepen their knowledge and understanding about the new technologies to the 
extent that they will be able to change and modify the new technologies, and eventually to 
introduce new technologies.  
Being embedded in a latecomer context, the latecomer companies are facing rather difficult task 
in developing innovation capabilities for a couple of reasons. First, being away from lead-users, 
the latecomers do not have access to information and knowledge about the latest technological 
developments. Second, the demand on the latecomer domestic market is less sophisticated 
technologically than the demand on the lead markets, which makes it difficult for the domestic 
market to become a training ground for technological capabilities building, which subsequently 
to be deployed on the international markets. Third, the domestic research and education 
infrastructure often does not provide the latecomers with well-trained graduates, and also 
information and knowledge about the frontier technological developments. All these make the 
process of technological capabilities building a difficult task for the latecomer companies. 
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3. TAXONOMY OF TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES AND THE NOTION 
OF COHERENCE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES 
This section will present a brief description of taxonomy of technological capabilities, with the 
attempts being placed on deriving the notion of different levels of coherence of technological 
capabilities out of it. 
 
3.1 Taxonomy of technological capabilities 
Several approaches exist in the literature aiming to classify the technological capabilities. For 
the purposes of this paper the taxonomy will be reviewed only with respect to the distinction 
between production and innovative capabilities. The seminal studies have identified three major 
technological capabilities: production, investment and innovative capabilities (Westphal, 1985), 
and production, investment and linkage capabilities (Lall, 1992). While another study has 
emphasised that the most important remains the distinction between capabilities to operate new 
technologies vs. capabilities to innovate (Bell, 1993). 
Building upon these initial classifications, a more recent study (Figueiredo, 2001) focussed on 
the transition from production to innovative capabilities. It elaborated the taxonomy by 
disaggregating routine production capabilities and innovative capabilities, and identifying the 
intermediate capabilities within them. To build innovative capabilities the latecomers need to 
pass through a number of intermediate capabilities, starting from basic routine capabilities, 
passing through pre-intermediate innovative capabilities, to reach extra basic innovative 
capabilities, and eventually build advanced innovative capabilities. The underlying idea behind 
this model is the sequence in building innovative capabilities, and the cumbersome transition 
from routine production capabilities towards accumulating innovative capabilities. 
 
3.2 The notion of coherence of technological capabilities 
Building on the distinction between production and innovative capabilities, the studies outline 
that clear stages emerge in the process of technological capabilities building: the latecomers 
begin with building production capabilities and later on embark on building more sophisticated 
capabilities, which would allow them to introduce changes in the technologies and eventually to 
innovate (Bell, 1993; Figueiredo, 2001; Westphal, 1985).  
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The research emphasises that a clear sequence occurs between these stages of development of 
technological capabilities. Having accumulated basic capabilities, and deepened and broaden 
further their skills, the latecomer companies attempt to build higher level capabilities, which 
would allow them to ‘move upwards’ the technological ladder (Hobday, 1995). Building upon a 
foundation of basic production capabilities, the latecomer companies need to develop deeper 
engineering skills. Learning-by-doing and learning by imitating are the major drivers in this 
stage, backed up by reverse engineering efforts. Once the latecomer company has developed 
ample engineering skills, it has the potential to move on to the next stage of technological 
capabilities of initiating minor and major changes to the technology. To do so, the latecomer 
companies need to further broaden and deepen their capabilities, and acquire additional 
knowledge and skills, which would allow them to develop a set of ‘higher level’ capabilities of 
initiating minor and major changes to the technology. The final stage in the process of 
technological capabilities building involves reaching mature capabilities, which allow the 
companies to innovate themselves.  
In this sense, we can envisage the process of technological capabilities building as a process of 
developing a set of essential capabilities to manage new technologies, followed by a process of 
acquiring deeper and broader knowledge and skills to develop ‘higher level’ technological 
capabilities of introducing minor and major change, and eventually reaching mature 
technological capabilities enabling the latecomers to innovate and introduce new technologies 
themselves. The transition from simple OEM/subcontracting to ODM (own design manufacture) 
and in some instances, to OBM (own brand manufacture) is an example of climbing the 
technological ladder. This has been the logic of the transition from imitation to innovation, 
which the successful latecomers in East Asia managed to perform (Hobday, 1995; Kim, 1997).  
While deepening the technological capabilities, the latecomer companies pass through 
subsequent stages of technological sophistication, which can be pictured as a ‘technological 
ladder’. In this sense, we can portrait the process of technological capabilities building as a 
subsequent process of developing capabilities with higher level of technological sophistication.  
The notion that latecomer companies need to ‘climb up’ the technological ladder suggests that 
different companies occupy different positions in the technological ladder. In other words, the 
latecomer companies have different success in their attempts to build technological capabilities, 
which reflects on the degree of sophistication of the accumulated technological capabilities. 
Following that perspective we can distinguish different levels of accumulation of technological 
capabilities, when we analyse the technological capabilities in the latecomer companies, which 
would be an indicator of different levels of technological maturity among companies. 
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Building innovative capabilities is a cumbersome task, as innovative capabilities encompass an 
array of skills and abilities with high complexity. Development of a mastery over a whole set of 
skills and capabilities is not an automatic process, and this is particularly difficult in the case of 
highly intricate skills. It may well happen that the latecomer companies succeed to develop 
some of the skills and abilities in the set better than others. This will result in a situation, where 
latecomer companies have developed different abilities to a different degree. Subsequently, 
disparity may occur among the degree of development of the capabilities constituting the set.  
Disparity among the level of development of the capabilities in the set, in result will produce 
‘looseness’ of the fit among the capabilities in the set. Respectively, a set of capabilities, which 
are all developed to a high degree, can be expected to generate a high level of ‘tightness’ of the 
fit. In other words, depending on the degree of development of the constituent capabilities in the 
set, different level of coherence will accrue in the technological capabilities. We define these 
phenomena as different levels of coherence of technological capabilities.  
Are different levels of coherence of technological capabilities manifest in practice? This 
question has not been addressed in the literature so far. Studies have emphasised that 
technological capabilities building involves development of an array of skills and capabilities. 
The analysis has been directed at the type of capabilities, which the latecomer companies need 
to develop. Studies about technological capabilities have adopted both qualitative and 
quantitative assessment, but none of them have detected so far the phenomena of different levels 
of coherence of technological capabilities. A few comparative studies have been undertaken. 
Some of them focus on the development of individual capabilities and comparison between 
different companies (Figueiredo, 2001; Marcelle, 2004), or different industries (Ernst, 1998), or 
search for contrast between capabilities of developed and developing countries (Tremblay, 
1994); others compare domestic-oriented vs. export-driven companies (Kim and Lee, 2002; 
Marcelle, 2004). But so far, no study had identified different levels of coherence of 
technological capabilities, which is the aim of this paper.  
Exploring the coherence of technological capabilities in a latecomer software industry presents 
another challenge. So far, studies analysing the process of technological capabilities have been 
predominantly focussed on the industrial sector, studying development of the electronics 
industry (Gee, 1998; Hobday, 1995, 1995; Kim, 1997; Kim and Lee, 2002; Mytelka, 1998), 
textiles (Gee, 1998; Lall, 1987), pulp and paper industry (Figueiredo, 2001; Tremblay, 1994), 
steel industry (Dutrenit, 2000; Lall, 1987), telecommunications (Marcelle, 2004), etc. Very few 
studies have been exploring the development of a latecomer software industry, placing 
capabilities as a point of the analysis (Athreye, 2005; Heeks, 1998; Tschang, 2001, 2003). Their 
contributions and shortcomings are outlined below, as well as the fact that so far, the concept of 
the technological capabilities building has not been applied to the software industry, which is 
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the aim of this paper. As the predominant part of the studies have been directed at exploring 
technological capabilities in industrial sector, the analytical framework developed in the field so 
far has been reflecting the specifics of the industrial sector. However, a study investigating the 
technological capabilities in a latecomer software industry needs to take into account the 
specifics of the software industry, which is discussed in the following section. 
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4. SPECIFICS IN ANALYSING THE TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES IN 
THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY 
A study about the technological capabilities building in the software industry needs to reflect the 
specific characteristics of the industry. First, software production, more than any other industrial 
activity, is almost by definition an innovation activity because it aims to produce new products 
or new ways of executing known tasks and functions (Torrisi, 1998). Therefore, when analysing 
the technological capabilities in the software industry, the distinction between production and 
innovative capabilities becomes blurred. To produce software solutions latecomer companies 
need to possess capabilities to innovate to some extent. As the production of software solutions 
involves innovation to a certain degree, the array of skills that are needed to produce a software 
solution, i.e. the production capabilities, embrace also innovative capabilities. Therefore, to 
explore the production capabilities in the case of software companies, the analysis needs to 
incorporate also the innovation-generating capabilities. The degree of novelty may vary in the 
software production process. This point holds even for software companies in developed 
countries context but it is particularly relevant in analysing the latecomer software production, 
and it is addressed at a later point in the analysis.  
Second, the degree of innovativeness depends on companies’ abilities, but also on customers’ 
requirements. If a latecomer software company operates in a market with less sophisticated 
technological demand, it may produce software solutions, which are innovative for that market, 
but behind the frontier technological developments on the international markets. Hence, 
accepting the inherent innovative nature of the software production, it is also meaningful to 
distinguish between innovation for international markets and innovation for the domestic 
market, especially when the latter is a latecomer context.  
Third, the software industry is a human capital-intensive industry, rather than a physical capital-
intensive industry. Development of successful software products or services depends on the 
deployment of skills and capabilities of the computer engineers. The challenge, which the 
latecomer software companies face, is to build technological capabilities enabling them to 
produce software, which can be commercialised abroad, based on the skills and abilities, which 
computer engineers have acquired in a latecomer context.  
Due to the specifics of the software production, we need to scrutinise each of the constituent 
capabilities in the set of the technological capabilities. So far, not a single study has been 
undertaken to systematically explore the technological capabilities, which the latecomer 
software companies need to develop. The development of a software industry has gained a 
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particular attention in the literature recently, due to the spectacular outbursts of software 
development activities in a number of latecomers. Some analyses have mentioned capabilities as 
an important driver in the latecomer software industries development, but none of them had 
provided an analytical framework of how to analyse them. Review of the main studies about 
development of latecomer software industries is done below, outlining their contributions and 
shortcomings.   
The discussion about capabilities building can be traced back to the seminal works of Schware 
(1989; 1992), Correa (1996) and Heeks (2002), which were discussing the entry strategies for 
latecomer software industries. Despite their mentioning of capabilities as an important driver in 
this development, neither of the studies provides a framework for analysing capabilities in a 
latecomer software industry.  
The recent spectacular outbursts of software development activities undertaken by indigenous 
software industries in a number of developing countries, like India, China and Brazil, have 
attracted particular attention for research (see for example among many others, for all 
developing countries (Carmel, 2003; Minevich, 2005), for India (Arora, 2001; Athreye, 2005), 
for China (Tschang, 2005), for China vs. India (Contractor, 2004), for Brazil (Botelho, 2005). 
Some of these analyses have mentioned capabilities as an important driver in the latecomer 
software industries development, but none of them had provided an analytical framework of 
how to analyse them.  
Attempts to provide a framework for analysing the capabilities, which the latecomer software 
companies need to develop, have been done by Tschang (2001; 2003) and by Heeks (1998). 
Although certain merit needs to be given to these papers for their pioneering efforts, all of them 
have significant limitations.  
While discussing the development of the Romanian software industry Heeks (1998) adopts the 
theoretical framework about technological capabilities building and makes an attempt to provide 
taxonomy of the software technological capabilities. The study outlines different software 
production activities representing different phases in climbing the technological ladder to 
perform more sophisticated software production. However, it remains focussed only on the 
range of software activities, rather than on the capabilities underlying these activities or the 
array of software capabilities needed to produce software in a latecomer context. Further, the 
theoretical framework seems decoupled from the empirical section, which explores 
predominantly the institutional foundations (and their transformation) and briefly touches upon 
the development of software activities in the latecomer software industry in question, and thus 
does not provide a clear approach of how to apply the proposed framework. 
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The study of Tschang (2001) derives the capabilities from the software development model 
itself. Such an approach is insufficient to provide a systematic account of the range of 
capabilities, which latecomer software companies need to develop in order to compete on the 
international markets. In Tschang (2003) the author abandons the first approach of deriving the 
capabilities from the software development model. Rather, it provides a list of capabilities, 
which although relevant, is far from systematic and does not provide a clear description of the 
listed capabilities nor does it exhaust the array of capabilities, which the latecomer software 
companies need to master.  
A recent book by Arora and Gambardella (2005) have analysed the underpinnings of the 
successful development of the software industries in several latecomer countries, among them 
India, China and Brazil. Alongside the specific developments in the individual countries, the 
study outlines the driving forces in the development of a software industry in a latecomer 
context. The capabilities emerge as an important driver underlying the success of these 
latecomers, as emphasised in the individual countries’ chapters (see (Athreye, 2005), in 
particular; also (Botelho, 2005; Tschang, 2005) and the conclusions (Arora, 2005).  
Despite the explicit emphasis about their importance, the analysis does not provide a framework 
for analysing capabilities. In the individual chapters, the analysis about the capabilities is 
combined with the rest of the factors affecting the industry development and it is the sources of 
incubation of capabilities that remain the focal points of the analysis, rather than a detailed 
analysis of the capabilities themselves (Athreye’s chapter presents a good exception). Similar 
logic applies to the conclusions, which emphasise the importance of firms’ capabilities but 
remain focussed on the sources of firms’ competences (Arora, 2005). An explicit framework 
about the specifics of technological capabilities building in the latecomer context and a 
connection with the literature in the field of technological development in the latecomer context 
is absent.  
The study by Athreye (2005) deserves attention. Although it had not provided an analytical 
framework nor had explored the issue systematically, it had captured the underlying idea of 
capabilities building. Exploring the development of the Indian software industry and the success 
factors contributing to its development, Athreye (2005) outlines that the evolutionary 
development of capabilities indeed underpins the Indian success. The study reveals that the 
Indian companies had entered the international markets by providing basic programming skills, 
but later on they have developed skills for software process control and large-scale projects 
management, to respond to the competitive pressure on the international outsourcing markets.  
The identified skills by Athreye and their development over time reflect the skills and 
capabilities necessary to develop successful outsourcing software industry in a latecomer 
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context. But these present a limited number of capabilities and they are highly insufficient to 
exhaust the list of capabilities, which latecomer software companies need to develop to be able 
to compete on the international markets. The aim of this paper is to look at the variety of 
capabilities, which the latecomer software companies need to build, enabling them to develop 
software products and services based on indigenous efforts.  
A range of paths, like developing own products and services for domestic or international 
markets, lay before latecomers, and outsourcing software products and services is just one path 
in this development. In the latter case the capabilities building would be heavily influenced by 
learning spillovers from multinational enterprises. Different paths may well require and call 
upon different capabilities, which latecomer companies need to master. For example, 
outsourcing will require a set of skills, which will be limited and significantly more narrow than 
the set of skills required for companies to produce their own products and services. This issue, 
however, will be explored in further research and is beyond the scope of this paper, which 
makes an attempt to identify the capabilities that latecomer software companies need to build in 
general, and this applies to the case of building capabilities with indigenous resources to 
produce own products and services. 
A study, which had investigated the capabilities that software companies need to master, is 
Torrisi (1998). However, this study analyses the European software industry, and thus, it 
explores a software industry in developed countries context. As underlined above, development 
of a latecomer software industry is rather different from that in developed countries context. To 
develop successfully, latecomer companies need to compensate for the environment, in which 
they are embedded in, and to do so, they need to put deliberate efforts in developing an array of 
technological capabilities, starting from the basic technical capabilities.  
In analysing the capabilities, which European software companies possess, Torrisi has outlined 
five capabilities: capabilities in mathematics, computer science, system engineering, experience 
with application server, and marketing (Torrisi, 1998, p. 136). However, if we are to explore in-
depth the technological capabilities of latecomer software companies, this list of technological 
capabilities is rather limited for two of reasons. First, it does not exhaust all technical 
capabilities, which companies need to master to be able to produce software products and 
services. Torrisi seems to assume that the basic technical capabilities are sufficient to ensure 
competitive performance. The author of this paper believes that software companies need to 
master a wider array of technical capabilities and Torrisi’s list is limited and does not exhaust 
the capabilities associated with software production neither in a latecomer context nor in 
advanced context. Second, if they are to become successful, the latecomer software companies 
in particular need to develop mastery over a wide array of organisational capabilities, which go 
well beyond the only one organisational capability, listed by Torrisi, the marketing capability. 
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The proposed approach for analysing technological capabilities suggests that software 
companies need to master a wide range of technical and organisational capabilities to ensure 
competitive performance. These holds equally for software companies in a latecomer and 
advanced context but the emphasis here is placed on the latecomers, as for them developing 
technological capabilities is particularly challenging. 
The analysis below makes an attempt to identify the technological capabilities, which latecomer 
software companies need to develop. As underlined above, the development of the production 
capabilities will be the focal point of this paper, while the other capabilities will be explored in 
future research. 
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5. APPROACH FOR ANALYSING TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES IN A 
LATECOMER SOFTWARE INDUSTRY  
To be able to produce software product or services, a latecomer company needs to develop an 
array of capabilities. Table 1 below summarises the capabilities constituting integral parts of the 
production technological capabilities, which the latecomer software companies need to develop. 
The subsequent section provides an overview of each of the listed capabilities and a discussion 
about the challenges for latecomer software companies to build them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Production technological capabilities for latecomer software companies 
 
 
The first capability, which the latecomer software companies need to develop, is the capability 
for software design. It is associated with the phase of inception of a software development, 
when software companies need to design how the software will look and perform based on 
identified clients’ needs. To develop expertise in software design the latecomer software 
companies need to develop understanding about system architecture design. They need to design 
an architecture that reflects and balances the different needs of its stakeholders; to focus on 
architecturally significant aspects of design, including frequently overlooked areas such as 
performance, resilience, and location; to use perspectives to ensure that their architecture 
exhibits important qualities such as performance, scalability, and security. Alongside these, the 
latecomers need to develop deeper understanding about design techniques, which involves 
building knowledge and expertise about graphics design, website design, multimedia solutions, 
etc. All these activities illustrate the range of capabilities and skills, associated with software 
design, which latecomers need to develop. 
The next capability, the capability for software programming, is associated with the next phase 
in the production of a software product or service, which is the actual writing of the software. 
Knowledge about software programming languages and techniques, and platforms creates the 
base for actual writing of the software. However, latecomers need to develop deep 
Capabilities for software design 
Capabilities for software programming 
Capabilities for network applications 
Capabilities in various operating environments  
Capabilities for high quality assurance 
Capabilities for prompt delivery 
Capabilities to develop specialised expertise in a particular domain 
Capabilities to diversify the products and services offered 
Capabilities for minor, moderate and major innovation 
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understanding about software programming. They need to build expertise about algorithms, 
software programming languages, etc. Building expertise in modern software programming 
languages requires developing understanding about Java, XML, JavaScript, HTML, CSS, XSL, 
XSLT, C++, C and Object-C. Further, mastering one of these languages requires developing 
deeper understanding about it. For example, to develop excellent programming skills the 
latecomers need not only to learn the syntax of the Java programming language, but also object-
oriented programming with the Java programming language; creating graphical user interfaces 
(GUI), exceptions, file input/output (I/O), threads and networking. The capabilities for software 
programming embrace intrinsically expertise in system analysis. The purpose of the system 
analysis is to produce a list of functionality that the system should provide, which describes the 
functions the system should perform, business logic that processes data, what data is stored and 
used by the system, and how the user interface should work. To develop capabilities for system 
analysis the latecomers companies need to develop deep understanding about different 
platforms, functionality, user interface, and also good understanding of the underlying business 
process, which the software solution is to support.  
Creating a modern software product or service requires also capabilities for networking 
applications. The networking applications include any kind of software solution, which operates 
in a network environment. A wide range of software solutions nowadays involve networking. 
For example, the information system in a company represents a network (i.e. intranet). 
Simultaneously, the companies are using software solutions operating in Internet (i.e. web-based 
solutions), while executing their every day operations for document sharing, coordination, 
communication, payment, etc. Therefore, the software company, which develops a new software 
solution for a client, needs to take into account the access by multiple users to the network 
resources such as files and to ensure security over the access. To be able to develop reliable 
networking applications the latecomer software companies need to build expertise in security 
engineering. They need to develop understanding about the network operating systems, security 
protocols, techniques for specifying and implementing a security policy, etc. This may present a 
cumbersome task for the latecomers, as network security is among the most dynamic fields, 
which has been rapidly developing recently. 
Alongside building capabilities for software design, programming and networking, the 
latecomer software companies need also to build capabilities in various operating environments, 
to become capable of responding to various clients’ needs and requirements. Although Windows 
operating system is the dominant computer platform, other operating systems like Linux, Unix 
or Mac are also used. Therefore, the latecomer software companies need to learn software 
design, programming and networking not only in one platform, but to build expertise in all 
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existing platforms and to be able to use Windows, Linux, Unix or Mac platform, depending on 
customers’ requirements.  
Applying all of the above capabilities, the latecomer companies need to deliver high quality 
products and services, if they are to be successful. In order to deliver high quality products and 
services, the latecomers need to build capabilities for software quality assurance. The major 
challenge in developing software products and services refers to the reliability of the software. 
Therefore, software quality assurance is a critical factor in developing software products and 
services. Developing capabilities for software quality assurance has become an extensive focus 
of attention among practitioners and academics, resulting in creation of quality assurance 
guidelines, reflected both in ISO certification scheme and Capability Maturity Model (CMM) 
assessment scheme. Being certified in one of these, or not, the latecomer software companies 
need to apply software quality assurance techniques, so to insure the quality and reliability of 
the software they deliver. Rigorous testing, de-bugging and defect elimination are critical steps 
in insuring the quality of the produced software.  
The next important capability, which the latecomer software companies need to develop, is the 
capability for prompt delivery. Meeting deadlines is crucial, as failure to do that result in 
increasing costs of the project. Delivery on time is extremely important on lead international 
markets, whereas in some latecomer countries clients might be more lenient toward delays. This 
by it self, creates a challenge for latecomer companies to execute projects meeting strictly the 
deadlines. To be able to do that, they need to develop abilities and skills for project 
management, tracking the work progress throughout the project, clarifying project requirements 
at the very beginning, effective communication between parties throughout the project, etc.  
If the latecomer companies are to climb the technological ladder, they need to be also capable of 
developing specialised expertise in a particular domain.  A challenge, which the latecomers face 
in software development, and especially if they are to develop their own products or services, is 
associated with the depth of understanding they have about the domain, for which the software 
is created. Developing a deep understanding and expertise about frontier technologies is 
particularly challenging for latecomer companies as they are embedded in a latecomer context, 
as mentioned above, and therefore, developing expertise by focussing on a particular domain 
appears to be a more realistic strategy for the latecomer companies to secure their attempts for 
technological upgrading.  
For instance, good knowledge and understanding of finance and banking system is required, if a 
software company is to create finance or banking software solution. The task becomes even 
more cumbersome, if a latecomer company is willing to develop finance or banking solution for 
international markets, where the operations are far more complex and sophisticated; and 
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therefore, the latecomer company needs to put deliberate efforts to develop deeper 
understanding about its specifics. A second example is the development of an ERP system. To 
be able to build an ERP system, a latecomer software company needs to develop an 
understanding about the structure of the ERP systems. Once the latecomer company had 
developed an expertise in the ERP domain, it needs to augment it with knowledge and 
understanding about the corporate practices in the particular market and particular industry, for 
which it is to be developed.   
The capability to diversify their products and services is perhaps the most difficult to achieve by 
the latecomer software companies. The software companies are specialised suppliers according 
to Pavitt’s (1984) taxonomy, i.e. companies providing specialised products. Being specialised 
suppliers do not preclude diversification. Companies can diversify their products and services 
within their specialised niche. Diversifying the range of products and services, which a company 
offers, creates an opportunity for companies in lead economies to reap greater benefit of their 
knowledge base. The same holds for the prospects of latecomer companies to reap greater 
benefits by diversifying the range of their products and services, but, at the same time, it 
remains much harder for latecomer companies to succeed in diversification, due to the limited 
access to frontier technological knowledge they have, being embedded in a latecomer 
environment.   
Once the latecomer companies have developed expertise in a particular domain, they may 
decide to broaden the range of products and services they offer, based on the experience and 
knowledge they have, or market opportunities they perceive. The degree of diversification may 
vary. Diversifying by introducing new products or services, which require the latecomer 
company to enter a new domain, which is completely separate from the domain, in which the 
company has accumulated expertise so far, is associated with high risk for any company, 
especially latecomers. Diversifying by introducing new products or services, which are close to 
the existing range, and respectively, to the already accumulated expertise in a particular field, is 
far less risky endeavor for companies, especially when they are latecomers. For example, 
developing a modular web-based platform for automated billing, invoicing and customer 
management for the one spectrum of services, for example Voice-over-IP involves lower 
technological efforts and leads to lower degree of diversification in a company, which have 
developed to that moment a modular web-based platform for automated billing, invoicing and 
customer managements for the whole spectrum of services, like Voice over Broadband, Internet, 
triple play, WiMAX and regular voice communication services. Introducing the same 
development will require significantly higher technological efforts and will result in a higher 
degree of diversification in a company, which has just decided to enter the field of automated 
billing. Diversification is a pretty difficult task for latecomers, given that they need to maintain 
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the depth of expertise in a particular domain and at the same time to broaden the range of the 
products and services within that domain, or to broaden the expertise in different domains.  
Last but the most important capabilities in the set are the capabilities for minor, moderate or 
major innovation. The extent to which a latecomer company has been able to accumulate a 
variety of skills and abilities to master new technologies reflects on its innovative capabilities. 
As underlined above, innovativeness is an intrinsic characteristic of the software production and 
yet the degree of innovativeness may vary. This point is particularly important in studying the 
latecomer software industry, as it calls the research to disentangle the software innovation 
process and to classify the software production in terms of its degree of innovativeness. So far 
this has not been done about the software production in latecomer context and the following 
analysis attempts to address this point.  
The innovative component is inherent to the very nature of software production, as outlined by 
Torrisi (1998). However, different types of software production activities involve different level 
of innovative efforts and respectively, result in software products and services with different 
degree of innovativeness inbuilt in them.  
Software services like re-coding legacy applications into more modern computer languages, 
data migration, or resolving specific incompatibilities between similar systems, etc, bear small 
innovative component. On the other hand, producing software customised services and software 
packages usually involve higher degree of innovativeness. For example, to successfully launch 
an ERP or CRM system, or e-commerce solution, a latecomer software company needs to 
deploy sophisticated knowledge and expertise, and to offer a solution, which is comparable to 
the frontier technological developments in that particular domain. Therefore, it is meaningful to 
distinguish between capabilities for minor, moderate and major innovation, when studying the 
degree of innovative efforts associated with producing particular software products or services.  
The proportion of activities like re-coding, data migration, resolving incompatibility, etc. can be 
expected to account for a significant share in the software services offered by latecomer 
companies. On the other hand, the presence of major innovative activities, like creation of 
packages or customised services, despite their small share in the latecomer software 
developments, notifies the existence of potentially significant innovative capabilities in the 
latecomers. This makes it important to analyse the type of software activities, which the 
latecomer companies offer, and the type of innovative capabilities (i.e. degree of 
innovativeness) they involve. 
It holds for all above mentioned capabilities that qualitative assessment needs to be undertaken 
to provide a comprehensive picture about the technological capabilities, which the latecomer 
software companies have been able to develop, but for the innovative capabilities it is 
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particularly the case, as it is virtually impossible the analysis of the innovative capabilities to be 
based on quantitative assessment. For this reason, the quantitative assessment of the capabilities 
will leave aside the analysis of innovative capabilities, as well as the analysis of capabilities for 
networking applications and capabilities in different environments.   
In the following section we apply the above classification of the production technological 
capabilities by undertaking quantitative analysis of the capabilities, which the companies in the 
indigenous software industry in Bulgaria have been able to develop. The analysis is based on a 
survey and the capabilities are explored on a five-point scale, where 1 stands for poor, 2 for 
modest, 3 for good, 4 for very good, and 5 for excellent.  
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6. TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES IN THE INDIGENOUS SOFTWARE 
INDUSTRY IN BULGARIA 
6.1. Overview of the development of the Bulgarian software industry and the 
conducted survey  
The Bulgarian software industry reveals a clear ‘bifurcation’ pattern with respect to its export 
intensity: the predominant part of the companies (around 80%) operates only on the domestic 
market, while the rest of the companies work predominantly on the international markets, and 
very few companies position in the middle of the scale.  Furthermore, most of the companies 
that are involved actively in exporting had entered the international markets straight from the 
very beginning, without serving the domestic market beforehand, as previous studies based on a 
survey and interviews revealed (Rousseva, 2001; 2003; 2005).  
On the domestic market the indigenous software companies provide the whole range of software 
activities, like system integration, computer system software, networking software and web-
design, CAD/CAM/CAE software, intermediate telecommunications and wireless development 
software, application software, firmware. On the international markets the Bulgarian companies 
appear to have developed far more narrow range of software activities: some companies are 
outsourcing and few companies succeeded to enter the international arena by offering their own 
products and customised services.  
The analysis of the technological capabilities in the indigenous Bulgarian software industry is 
based on a survey conducted in the period September-November 2004 among 38 leading 
indigenous software companies. Out of them 78% operate only on the domestic market. The rest 
22% of the companies have 50% and above export intensity (i.e. sales abroad account to 50% 
and above of the total turnover). The group of exporters comprises a diverse set of companies. 
The biggest group, representing 16% of the whole sample are companies having 90% and above 
export intensity. The rest of the exporters are single or few companies to position in the scale 
between 50-89% export intensity. 
The analysis below will be directed at comparing and contrasting between the performance of 
the domestic-oriented vs. the export-driven companies. The analysis is undertaken in a 
comparative manner, but the percentages reported refer to the share in the sample as a whole, 
not within the sub-groups. All companies included in the sample are companies considering 
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themselves to offer new products or services2, and thus the database is a fruitful base for 
comparing ‘domestic’ vs. ‘export’ technological capabilities. 
6.2 Analysis of the individual technological capabilities accumulated in domestic-
oriented vs. export-driven companies 
In this section, the analysis is directed at exploring the difference in the individual capabilities 
of the domestic-oriented vs. the export-driven companies. Capabilities, like software 
programming, software design, quality of products and services, prompt delivery, specialised 
expertise in a particular domain, and diversified expertise are assessed with respect to their 
deployment on the domestic and the international markets. 
The analysis begins by focussing on the basic technical capabilities, like the capabilities for 
software design and software programming.  
Most of the surveyed companies feel confident that their capabilities for software design meet 
adequately the requirements of the local market, as the mean of 4.86 reveals. All exporters 
consider that they have excellent capabilities for software design for the needs of the domestic 
market. The predominant part of the domestic-oriented companies, representing 64% of the 
companies in the sample, shares the same opinion. While the rest of domestic-oriented 
companies, comprising 14% of the sample, assess their software design capabilities as very 
good as compared to the needs of the domestic market.  
The difference in the technological capabilities of the domestic-oriented vs. the export-driven 
companies becomes more obvious when assessing the extent to which the capabilities for 
software design allow the companies to compete on the international markets. The mean of 3.07 
and the mode of 3 reveal that the prevailing number of companies considers their capabilities for 
software design as average as compared to the requirements of the international markets. 
Moreover, this is the only variable within the set of the narrow technical capabilities, which 
appears with a mode lower than 5. Only 21.6% of the companies assess their capabilities for 
software design as excellent and adequate to respond to challenges on the international markets. 
These are all exporters, while among the domestic-oriented companies only two companies 
reveal the same confidence. Among the exporters the confidence in the excellence in their own 
capabilities prevails, and only two companies find their capabilities as good rather then 
excellent. The latter are again companies having 90% export intensity, and this group remains 
modest in the assessment of their own performance. Apparently this sub-group of exporters 
faces difficulties in building technological capabilities and despite being actively involved in the 
                                                     
2 To be able to analyse technological capabilities of latecomer software companies operating 
only on domestic market, it is important to distinguish between companies offering innovative 
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international markets, still remains unsure that it is capable to perform as its foreign competitors 
do. This sub-group of exporters presents a special case of among exporters and we will devote 
special attention to it later on in the analysis. 
The overall assessment of the software design capabilities of the domestic-oriented companies is 
far less optimistic than the one for the exporters. Apart from the two companies, which assess 
their capabilities as excellent, the rest of the domestic-oriented companies are far less confident 
and consider that their capabilities for software design are average and below the average, when 
compared to the performance requirements on the international markets. Nearly 30% of the 
domestic-oriented companies find that their capabilities for software design are average, when 
compared to the needs of the international markets. Another 29.7% find their capabilities as 
modest, while 13.5% of the companies access their capabilities as poor.  
Further, the assessment of the capabilities for software design on the international markets for 
the sub-group of the domestic-oriented companies drops down to a mean of 2.4 and a mode of 3, 
which when compared to the mean of 4.75 and mode of 5 for the exporters, provides compelling 
evidence about the divergence in the capabilities for software design between the exporters and 
the domestic-oriented companies.  
Next we focus on the capabilities for software programming. All companies are confident that 
they possess capabilities for software programming, which adequately meet the needs on the 
local market (the mean is 4.92). Only 5.4% of the companies consider their capabilities as very 
good, and these are domestic-oriented companies, while all the rest of the companies, both 
domestic-oriented and exporters consider their capabilities for software programming as 
excellent. Similarly to the previous results, most of all Bulgarian software companies feel 
confident that their capabilities reflect adequately the requirements on domestic market. 
Nevertheless, the percentage of companies, which are more confident, is slightly higher, when 
assessing the capabilities for software programming rather then capabilities for software design. 
However, companies’ assessment of whether their software programming capabilities are 
adequate to the requirements of the international markets appears less favourable. Although the 
mode remains 5, the mean of 3.25 reveals that a large number of companies possess limited 
capabilities for software programming to match the needs of the international markets. Only 
22.2% of the companies in the sample consider their capabilities for software programming as 
excellent for executing international projects. All exporters but one believe that their capabilities 
for software programming match perfectly the requirements on the international markets. 
Among the domestic-oriented companies there is a single company, which considers itself of 
                                                                                                                                                           
solutions for the domestic market and to separate them from ‘garage’-type software services, 
which may be flourishing in latecomers. 
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possessing excellent capabilities for software programming on international projects, and the 
rest of the companies position down the scale: 13.9% very good, 27.8% good, and two groups of 
equal size of 16.7% modest and poor, respectively. Overall, 64% of the companies evaluate 
their capabilities for software programming as average and below the average as compared to 
the requirements of the international markets, and these are all domestic-oriented companies, 
except one. The domestic-oriented companies appear to possess significantly lower capabilities 
for software programming as compared to the requirements on the international markets, which 
is also indicated by the mean of 2.6 for this sub-group. These results suggest that a substantial 
part of the domestic-oriented companies fail to develop capabilities for software programming, 
respective to the frontier technological development and at this point the gap between the 
technological capabilities of domestic-oriented companies vs. the exporters begins to unravel.  
The results provide us with a clear picture of an indigenous software industry, in which a limited 
number of companies possess capabilities for software design, which allow them to compete on 
international markets, while the predominant part of the companies (above 70 percent) possess 
average and below average capabilities for software design, which prohibit them from entering 
the international markets. As this reflects the capabilities of the Bulgarian companies in one of 
the basic software engineering skills, it raises grounds for serious concerns about the potential, 
which the domestic-oriented companies have to enter the international markets, as it reveals that 
the Bulgarian companies face limitations even in the basic technical skills. Most of the 
Bulgarian companies appear to have limited technical capabilities for competing on the 
international markets, and the capabilities for software design appear to be more problematic 
than the capabilities for software programming. These results also confirm the existence of a 
difference in the capabilities for software programming between exporters and domestic-
oriented companies, which we also see with respect to the capabilities for software design.   
The results also raise an interesting point. There has been a wide held belief that due to the very 
good education in mathematics and sciences the East European computer engineers possess 
excellent software programming skills. This belief was confronted by studies about 
development of the software industry in CEE, which called for reconsideration of the myth 
about strong capabilities for software programming, which CEE programmers have (Dyker, 
1996; Katkalo, 1993). The results of our survey show that a significant number of companies 
(around 64 percent) consider themselves of having average and below the average skills in 
software programming, when compared to the international standards. These results evoke 
concerns about the level of education in computer engineering in Bulgaria and the extent to 
which it provides knowledge about the latest technological developments, and corroborate with 
the results of previous studies (Rousseva, 2001; 2003; 2005).  
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The level of expertise in software engineering and design reflects upon the quality of the 
products and services, designed by the companies. Next we assess the confidence, which 
companies have in the quality of products and services they offer. Most of the Bulgarian 
software companies are certain about the quality of the products and services, which they offer 
on the domestic market, which reflects in the mean of 4.70. The predominant number of the 
companies feel confident in the excellence of the products they offer, except few domestic-
oriented companies, representing 19.4% of the sample, and only two exporters, comprising 
5.6% of the whole, which assess the quality of their products and services as very good. The 
latter group of exporters are companies having 90% of export intensity, which continues to 
reveal lower level of performance than the rest of the exporters.  
Companies’ assessment about the quality of the products and services they offer on the 
international markets reveals greater heterogeneity. Although the mode remains 5, the mean 
drops down to 3.44. All export-driven companies, but one, are confident in the excellence of the 
quality of their products and services. While the answers of the domestic-oriented companies 
spread into in all categories, from poor to excellent quality. Of interest, 19.4% of the companies 
find that they have a potential to offer products and services on the international market with an 
excellent quality, and yet these are companies, which operate only on the domestic market.  
The question, which arises, is whether these companies overstated the confidence in their 
products and services. We need to bear in mind that the assessment is based on respondents’ 
subjective assessment and this may have an impact on the results. Respondents may speculate 
and provide results which put them in a more favourable position than the real situation, or they 
may provide answers, which reflect their subjective perception about the situation. Apparently, 
this holds for this part of the assessment, which can be considered as overrated. This group of 
companies may assume that it is capable of producing high quality products and services for the 
international markets. However, as these companies do not actually work on international 
markets, this assessment is more likely to reflect their perception rather then the reality.  
Companies assess themselves that they do not possess excellence in software programming and 
design capabilities to compete on the international markets, and therefore it is very unlikely that 
they have the potential to offer high-quality products and services on the international markets. 
Otherwise, being capable of offering high-quality products and services on international markets 
and bidding on their low labour costs advantage, these Bulgarian companies must have at least 
some level of export intensity. A more realistic treatment of these results would be to say that 
19.4% of the companies in the sample, which are companies operating only on the domestic 
market, hold high esteem about the products and services they offer and perceive their quality to 
be comparable to similar products on the international markets. Another 19.4% of the 
companies share completely the opposite view, assessing the quality of their products as poor 
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compared to the international markets’ standards. The rest 33% of the companies position in the 
middle of the scale.  
These results reveal that domestic-oriented companies form three distinct groups, somehow 
polarised in their assessment about their ability to generate products and services with a quality 
respective to the quality standards on the international markets. While some of the companies 
are highly confident, another group of equal number of companies is far negative and a third 
group position in the middle. The predominant part of the domestic-oriented companies, 
representing 55.6% of the companies, consider that the quality of the products and services they 
can offer on international markets is average and below the average. Correcting the answers by 
downgrading the potentially unrealistic high answers will add up extra numbers. These results 
are another indication about the extent to which the domestic-oriented companies have been 
successful in building technological capabilities. The interesting point they reveal is that a 
significant part of the domestic-oriented companies are aware of the moderate quality of their 
products and services and the limitations of their own capabilities.  
Prompt delivery is the next capability to be investigated. The predominant part of the companies 
delivers on time on the domestic market (a mean of 4.53). The exporters appear to perform 
better than the domestic-oriented companies. 75% of the exporters, representing 15.6% of the 
companies in the sample, point out that meeting deadlines is an integral part of their excellence, 
while 25% of the exporters outline that the promptness of delivery on the domestic market is 
very good rather then excellent. 75% of the domestic-oriented companies, representing 58.3% of 
the sample, also reveal excellence in the delivery on time on the domestic market, but the rest of 
them, representing 11.1% of the sample, are failing to deliver on time and consider that they 
have modest capabilities for prompt delivery on the domestic market.  
With respect to the promptness of delivery on the international markets companies diverge 
completely. All exporters but one reveal excellence in prompt delivery on the international 
markets. Interestingly enough, some of the exporters allow themselves to be more lenient in 
meeting deadlines while working on projects for the domestic market, while they appear to be 
very prompt on the international markets. This is an interesting fact by itself and it has its 
cultural grounds, as tolerance towards small delays is still an inherent part of the Bulgarian 
business culture. The difference in business cultures, and particularly the detrimental effect of 
lenient towards delays Bulgarian culture, becomes more apparent, when analysing the extent to 
which the domestic-oriented companies manage (or would be able to manage) to meet the 
deadlines in international projects. 40% of domestic-oriented companies, comprising 31.4% of 
the whole sample, consider themselves as having excellence in meeting deadlines in 
international projects, while two equal-size groups of domestic-oriented companies, each 
representing 17% of the whole sample, cluster around the two ends of the scale, having 
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respectively very good and poor delivery on the international markets, and a limited number of 
companies position in the middle of the scale.  
These results are provoking, as companies currently operating only on the domestic market 
provide answers about their performance on the international markets. The grounds for these are 
twofold. Some domestic-oriented companies had already made attempts to enter the 
international markets, which obviously were with no success, but on these grounds they are able 
to provide an assessment of their capabilities to perform on the international markets. Second, as 
discussed above, these results reflect companies’ subjective perception, and this may differ to an 
extent from the real situation. Further, the lowest score for domestic market is 2, while for 
international is 1. In other words, some of the domestic-oriented companies have outlined that 
they do not have the capabilities for prompt delivery both in domestic and international projects, 
with their skills for meeting the deadlines in international projects being considerably lower than 
in domestic projects.  
This raises serious concerns. It brings back the point about the prevailing business culture in 
Bulgaria. Apparently, those companies, which had adopted a more lenient approach towards 
meeting deadlines in the domestic projects, subsequently find it extremely difficult to cope with 
requirements in the international projects. Transition from domestic to export orientation 
appears to be a cumbersome task, with project management skills emerging as one of the 
hurdles on the way. This comes to suggest that even building capabilities for prompt delivery 
appears to be a problem and the latecomer companies need to tackle it. 
Next we look at how companies develop their knowledge base. Companies are asked to assess 
their specialised expertise in a particular domain on the domestic and international markets, and 
the diversification of their expertise.  
Bulgarian companies reveal confidence that they possess specialised knowledge and expertise 
about the local market, which is reflected by the mean of 4.41. 63.9% of the companies consider 
their knowledge as excellent, and the rest of the companies are equally distributed among 
answers very good and good. All exporters except two claim that they possess specialised 
expertise in a particular domain on the local market. The other two, however, present an 
interesting case. One of the companies considers itself as having very good expertise, but the 
other one claims that it possesses poor specialised expertise in a particular domain on the local 
market. This represents the only company having no specialised expertise in a particular domain 
on the local market within the whole sample. The reason for this perhaps lay in the fact that this 
company has 90% export intensity and it does not put special efforts in developing specialised 
expertise for the local market.  
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The domestic-oriented companies also appear to have developed specialised expertise about a 
particular domain on domestic markets. 47.2% of them consider themselves as having excellent 
specialised expertise about a particular domain on the domestic market, 13.9% very good and 
16.7% good respectively. Overall, most of the companies had developed specialised expertise 
about a particular domain on the domestic market. When compared to the rest of the variables in 
the set, there are very few answers in the lower end of the scale. Apparently companies perceive 
it mandatory to develop specialised expertise for a particular domain for to be able to compete.  
The situation seems rather different when companies evaluate their specialised expertise in a 
particular domain on the international markets. Although the mode remains 5, the mean drops 
down to 3.44. Interestingly enough, the mean, which the indigenous software industry attains, 
for having specialised expertise in a particular domain on international markets, is higher than 
the mean, which the industry obtains for its capabilities for software programming and software 
design on international markets. This again, raises concerns about the basic technical 
capabilities, which the indigenous software companies possess. 
Coming back to the results about the expertise in a particular domain on the international 
markets, the analysis confirms the previous patterns. All exporters have managed to develop 
specialised expertise about a particular domain on international markets, whereas the domestic-
oriented companies reveal greater divergence. 16.2% of the companies, which operate on the 
domestic market, outline that they possess specialised expertise about a particular domain on the 
international markets. The rest of the companies but one are clustered around the average and 
below average points of the scale. 16.2% of the companies consider themselves of having poor 
specialised expertise for a particular domain on the international markets, the rest of companies 
form two groups of 21.6% each by assessing their expertise as good and modest. Further, all 
exporters come up with a mean of 5, while the domestic-oriented companies attain a mean of 
2.8, which again reflects the difference in the specialised expertise in a particular domain in the 
international markets, which the companies of these two major groups have been able to 
develop. 
The number of companies having specialised expertise in a particular domain in the domestic 
market is 80%, which is considerably greater than the number of companies having specialised 
expertise in a particular domain in the international markets, which account to 50%. Perhaps the 
latter number needs correction downwards, as 16% of the companies consider themselves to 
have specialised expertise in a particular domain in the international markets but these are 
companies operating only on the domestic market and therefore, it is not realistic that they have 
adequate expertise to deploy on the international markets. Further, the number of companies, 
which have not been able to accumulate specialised expertise in a particular domain, is greater 
for the international markets than for the domestic one (nearly 40% of the indigenous companies 
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consider themselves as having below the average specialised expertise for a particular domain in 
the international markets). All these follow the domestically oriented profile of the industry, and 
suggest that a transition from the domestic to the international markets will be a challenging and 
perhaps impossible task for the majority of the companies. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that 
50% of the Bulgarian software companies claim that they possess specialised expertise in a 
particular domain in the international markets. Perhaps this figure needs to be treated with 
caution, as mentioned above, and yet, when compared with the actual export intensity figures, 
this suggests that about 30% of the companies indicate that they have competences, which they 
were not able to utilise to the moment.  
Finally, we focus on the extent to which the companies have been able to diversify the products 
and services, which they offer on the domestic and international markets. This appears to be the 
least developed capability among all, as both means are the lowest within the set. Companies 
diversify their products and services in the domestic market to a great deal, as the mean of 4.11 
reveals, whereas they have not been successful in diversifying their products and services in the 
international markets, as the mean of 2.64 suggests. 49% of the companies in the sample reveal 
excellent diversification of their products and services in the domestic market, another 30% - 
very good and 14% - good diversification. Only 8% of the companies appear to have poor 
diversification of their products and services in the domestic market.  
Unlike the previous variables, this one does not suggest a strong distinction between the 
performance of the domestic-oriented vs. the exporters. The exporters occupy the two ends of 
the scale - 70% of them perform a high level of diversification in the domestic market, while the 
rest reveal poor diversification. Parallel to this, there is no clear relation between the export 
intensity and the level of diversification. Nevertheless, a pattern emerges among the exporters. 
Exporters seem to reveal similar levels of diversification in the domestic and international 
markets, i.e. if an exporter has diversified its products and services in the international markets, 
it applies the same level of diversification of its products and services also in the domestic 
market. Respectively, low level of diversification in the international markets is coupled with 
low level of diversification in the domestic market. 
Whereas the domestic-oriented companies reveal better diversification in the domestic market 
than in the international markets. 41.7% reveal excellent diversification in the domestic market, 
22.2% very good and the rest 13.9% good diversification. The diversification in the 
international market differs completely. Only 2.7% outline that they have diversified products 
and services in the international markets, while 32.4% have good, 24.3% modest and 16.2% 
poor diversification. These results suggest that companies do attempt to diversify. But they 
achieve good diversification only in markets on which they have the capacity to compete, i.e. 
they have respective capabilities for software programming and software engineering, to 
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develop specialised expertise in a particular domain, ability to deliver on time, etc. Second, we 
again face the problem of having answers about performance on the international markets by 
companies, which operate only on the domestic market. In this case, we need to consider the 
answers as reflecting potentials. Some Bulgarian companies have made attempts of entering the 
international markets and these results may be considered to reflect the strategy of entering the 
international markets. Overall, the results reveal that Bulgarian companies have limited, if any, 
ability to diversify products and services, which they eventually would offer on the international 
markets. 
A final point in the analysis of the individual capabilities of the exporters vs. the domestic-
oriented companies is to be raised with respect to the group of exporters. All the exporters 
reveal excellence in their performance in all the above studied technological capabilities, with a 
mean of 5. There is only one sub-group of exporters, the companies with 90% export intensity, 
which reveal lower level of performance, with a mean ranging from 3.7 for capabilities in 
software programming, mean of 4.3 for capabilities in software design, mean of 4.7 for abilities 
to produce high quality products and services, and mean of 4.7 for capabilities for prompt 
delivery. The performance of this sub-group affects the assessment of the overall performance 
of the exporters, and therefore, it should be noted that the low performance is due to only that 
group and is not spread among all the exporters. At this point we are not in a position to outline 
the reasons for the lower performance of that particular group, and further investigation of the 
possible reasons on the basis of case studies is to be undertaken. 
6.3 Concluding remarks about the individual technological capabilities 
The analysis of the individual technological capabilities reveals that Bulgarian software 
companies appear confident in all of the outlined abilities, when deployed on the domestic 
market. Nevertheless, not all companies reveal the same levels of accumulation of capabilities, 
as the standard deviation reveals (table 1 in the Appendix). For some capabilities the companies 
reveal similar levels of accumulation, like the capabilities for software design and software 
programming. However, in the rest of the capabilities in the set companies’ performance 
deviates significantly. Standard deviation of (.520) emerges in the capabilities for producing 
high quality products and services, followed by high levels of deviation of (.971) and (.956) in 
the capabilities for prompt delivery and building expertise in a specialised domain respectively, 
and the highest deviation appears in the capabilities to diversify products and services (standard 
deviation of (1.173). 
Even greater deviation occurs with respect to companies’ abilities to perform on the 
international markets (table 1 in the Appendix). Companies appear to deviate significantly in 
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their capabilities to perform on international markets and this hold for all capabilities (all 
standard deviation coefficients range from (1.257) to (1.532).   
If we are to summarise the results of the analysis a clear distinction emerges between 
companies’ abilities to perform on the domestic and the international markets. Both the 
domestic-oriented companies and the exporters have managed to build capabilities for the 
domestic market, and they appear confident in the whole array of skills and capabilities, 
including the skills for software engineering, project management and expertise about the local 
market. Nevertheless, despite the strong performance of both groups on the domestic market, a 
slight distinction between the capabilities of the domestic-oriented companies and the exporters 
emerges, as the domestic-oriented companies reveal slightly lower coefficients for all 
capabilities than the exporters.  
This difference becomes far more noticeable when we compare the capabilities of the domestic-
oriented companies vs. the exporters to compete on the international markets. While all 
exporters reveal strong capabilities and expertise to perform on the international markets, the 
domestic-oriented companies appear far less successful in developing the necessary skills, 
expertise and capabilities to execute international projects. Thus, for example, when comparing 
the capabilities of the Bulgarian companies for software engineering and specialised expertise 
on the international markets, the exporters come up with coefficients, which are nearly twice 
higher the coefficients, which the domestic-oriented companies get. Further, for these 
capabilities the domestic-oriented companies position below the middle point of the evaluation 
scale, i.e. by obtaining means below 3. 
An interesting point emerges, when we compare the overall patterns of technological 
capabilities building of the exporters vs. the domestic-oriented companies. Both groups of 
companies are aiming to develop excellent capabilities for software engineering, good quality 
and prompt delivery, and specialised expertise in a particular domain in the market they serve. 
Developing excellence in all these capabilities for the market they serve appears to be a 
common pattern within these two groups of companies. However, the degree of diversification 
of the products and services, which the companies offer, seems to depend on the type of the 
market, in which the companies operate. In comparison with the exporters, the domestic-
oriented companies appear to have greater diversification in their products and services.  
This fact is most likely to be based on the following two pieces of evidence. First, the customers 
on the domestic market require products and services with lower technological sophistication 
than the international markets. This allows the companies to offer greater variety of products 
and services. Second, Bulgarian software companies are small and with little experience, and 
they have limited resources to deploy. To be able to enter the international markets, they attempt 
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to build highly specialised expertise about a particular domain rather than to diversify. This 
appears to be the pattern, which most of the exporters are following. Therefore, depending on 
their export intensity, the Bulgarian companies reveal different patterns of technological 
capabilities building and developing a knowledge base. 
Overall, the results of the analysis of the development of the individual technological 
capabilities of the domestic-oriented vs. the exporter-driven companies reveal sharp inter-group 
differences in the level of accumulated capabilities and the abilities to compete on the domestic 
and the international markets.  
These results have been also supported by the results of the ANOVA test, comparing the 
accumulation of capabilities in domestic-oriented companies vs. exporters. The ANOVA 
analysis confirms that significant differences exist between the exporters and the domestic-
oriented companies with respect to their capabilities for software programming for the 
international markets (coefficient (.000), capabilities for software design for the international 
markets (coefficient (.000), abilities to offer high quality products and services on  the 
international markets (coefficient (.001), and also with respect to the capability to develop 
specialised expertise in a particular domain in the international markets (coefficient (.000) (table 
3).  
These results are also confirmed by the correlation analysis of the export intensity and the 
technological capabilities of the companies (table 4). The correlation analysis reveals that the 
exporters possess significantly higher capabilities for the international markets than the 
domestic-oriented companies. The difference holds for all capabilities, respectively capabilities 
for software design (.608), software programming (.640), high quality (.539) and specialised 
expertise in a particular domain (.584) (the correlation coefficients for all these are significant at 
.01 level), and abilities for prompt delivery (.404) (the only correlation coefficient, which is 
only significant at .05 level). 
Significant differences between the capabilities of domestic-oriented vs. exporters appear in the 
whole array of skills and abilities necessary to compete on the international markets and higher 
level of accumulation appears in all technological capabilities in the group of the exporters. In 
this sense, the bifurcation pattern, which the industry performs in its export intensity, is 
underpinned by a bifurcation pattern in its technological capabilities. This also suggests that 
building technological capabilities to compete on the international markets involve greater 
technological efforts in all aspects and all levels of technological capabilities. A fact, which 
notifies that the domestic market requires less-sophisticated technological efforts to compete, 
and thus, offers very limited opportunities for the domestic-oriented companies to accumulate 
capabilities, which subsequently they will be able to deploy on the international markets.  
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These results contest the ‘walking on two legs’ proposition, suggesting that the latecomer 
software companies need to pay more attention to the domestic opportunities because of their 
high returns in terms of gaining experience and innovation in software production and providing 
training opportunities that allow a broadening of software exports (Schware, 1992). The case of 
Bulgaria, and most of the latecomer countries, shows that technological development in the 
domestic market does offer learning opportunities for software production and yet they remain 
far away from the frontier developments and do not enable the latecomer software companies to 
enter the international arena. 
On the grounds of this evidence, it appears that a dualistic pattern of capabilities emerges. Most 
of the companies operating on the domestic market seem to have managed to build 
technological capabilities for the domestic market, but not for the international markets. On the 
other hand, all exporters seem to possess technological capabilities enabling them to compete on 
the international markets and also on the domestic market. Thus, two separate sets of 
technological capabilities emerge: ‘domestic’ technological capabilities and ‘export’ 
technological capabilities.  
The ‘domestic’ technological capabilities represent the capabilities necessary for a company to 
compete and innovate on the domestic market. As the domestic market requires products and 
services with lower technological sophistication, the innovations, which the domestic-oriented 
companies introduce can be considered as new only to the domestic market, not necessarily to 
the world markets. Therefore, the ‘domestic’ technological capabilities can be seen as half-way 
built technological capabilities, when compared to the technological capabilities, which the 
latecomer companies need to perform in order to compete on the international markets. 
Apparently, the domestic-oriented companies are still half-way through ‘climbing up’ the 
technological ladder.  
Very few studies have been exploring the differences between the technological capabilities of 
companies, which have managed to build technological capabilities enabling them to compete 
on the international markets and the technological capabilities of companies, which are half-way 
through that process. In this sense, it is appealing to explore whether any other differences 
emerge between the ‘domestic’ technological capabilities and the ‘export’ technological 
capabilities, apart from the differences in the level of accumulated constituent capabilities 
enabling the companies to compete on the international markets. The investigation about the 
differences between the ‘domestic’ technological capabilities and the ‘export’ technological 
capabilities continues in the following section, looking at the level of coherence of the 
capabilities. 
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7. COHERENCE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES 
7.1. Methodological note on exploring the coherence of technological capabilities 
In this section the analysis will focus on the level of coherence of technological capabilities, 
which the companies perform on the domestic and the international markets. As underlined 
above, the exporters reveal significantly higher technological capabilities to compete on the 
international markets than the domestic-oriented companies (as confirmed by the ANOVA test 
and the correlation analysis).  
This section takes the analysis one step further in exploring the differences in the technological 
capabilities, which companies perform on the domestic market vs. the international markets. 
This analysis does not discriminate between the technological capabilities of the domestic-
oriented vs. the export-driven companies, although the exporters are responsible for the 
capabilities performed on the international markets, whereas the capabilities on the domestic 
market are entertained both by domestic-oriented and export-driven companies.  
Instead of distinguishing between the capabilities of the domestic-oriented and the export-driven 
companies, the analysis in this section investigates the difference between the technological 
capabilities, which the Bulgarian companies perform on the domestic vs. the international 
markets, to explore the coherence among the ‘domestic’ and ‘export’ technological capabilities.  
The analysis investigates the correlation between all capabilities, explored in the analysis so far, 
and compares the fit amongst them with respect to the market on which they are deployed. For 
example, the study looks at the fit between the capabilities for software programming and the 
capabilities for software design, which companies produce to compete on the domestic market, 
and compares them with the fit between the capabilities for software programming and the 
capabilities for software design, which companies produce to compete on the international 
markets.  
Taking into account the fit among the pairs of the individual capabilities, the analysis draws 
conclusions about the level of coherence among the capabilities performed on the domestic and 
international markets. Based on that, conclusions are derived about the level of coherence of the 
technological capabilities, which the companies perform on the domestic market (to what the 
analysis refers as ‘domestic’ technological capabilities) vs. the level of coherence of the 
technological capabilities, which the companies perform on the international markets (to what 
the analysis refers as ‘export’ technological capabilities). 
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The analysis below explores pair wise the fit between the capabilities, performed on the 
domestic market and then compares with fit between the same types of capabilities but 
performed on the international markets, and subsequently draws conclusions about the level of 
coherence among the ‘domestic’ vs. the ‘export’ technological capabilities. The results are 
based on Spearman correlation analysis, provided in table 3 in Appendix. The higher the 
correlation among the capabilities, the higher the fit amongst them, and respectively the higher 
the coherence in the aggregated technological capabilities performed on the domestic and the 
export markets. The correlation coefficients have been corroborated with the results of partial 
correlation controlling for size, export intensity, etc. and the latter show that the correlation 
coefficients remain largely unaltered, i.e. different levels of coherence emerge indeed. 
 
7.2 Degree of coherence of ‘domestic’ vs. ‘export’ technological capabilities  
 
The analysis of the level of coherence among capabilities is divided in two parts. The first 
section presents the capabilities, which reveal high level of coherence pair wise, while the 
second section looks at the capabilities with lower degree of coherence pair wise. 
7.2.1 Technological capabilities with high degree of coherence 
The highest degree of coherence within the set of capabilities pair wise appears between the 
capabilities to maintain specialised knowledge in a particular domain and the capabilities to 
produce high quality products and services. Companies that have been able to develop 
specialised expertise in a particular domain in the international markets appear to have been able 
to produce high quality products and services in the international markets, and the fit between 
the two appear to be extremely high (coefficient (.909). A comparable strong fit, although 
slightly lower, occurs between the capabilities to maintain specialised expertise in a particular 
domain in the domestic market and the ability to produce high quality products and services in 
the domestic market (coefficient (.740). Companies’ ability to produce high quality products 
and services is coupled in a tight fit with their capabilities for software programming and the 
capabilities for prompt delivery, but it’s extremely tight fit with the capabilities to maintain 
specialised expertise in a particular domain confirms that learning and accumulating expertise 
pays off utmost.  
Strong alignment occurs between companies’ abilities to maintain specialised expertise in a 
particular domain and the skills to deliver on time. Prompt delivery is a capability, which has 
been less deployed on the domestic market, as the analysis above revealed. It appears, however, 
that companies that have developed specialised expertise in a particular domain on the domestic 
market possess also strong skills for prompt delivery on the domestic market (coefficient (.679). 
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Moreover, the fit between these capabilities when performed on the domestic market is 
comparable to the fit between them, when deployed on the international markets (coefficient 
(.756). In other words, companies having specialised expertise in a particular domain appear to 
have developed strong skills for prompt delivery, and this hold equally for the domestic and 
international markets. This case represents the smallest distance between the fit of the ‘export’ 
vs. the ‘domestic’ technological capabilities. 
Exploring the coherence between the capabilities for software programming and software 
design, it appears that the fit between them when performed on the international markets is 
extremely strong (correlation coefficient .842). Although the fit between the capabilities for 
software programming and software design performed on the domestic market is also significant 
at .01 level, with the correlation coefficient (.604), the coefficient, or the fit between these two 
capabilities, when deployed on the international markets is 1.4 times higher than the fit on the 
domestic market. 
Similar parallelism emerges with respect to the fit between the capabilities for software 
programming and capabilities for producing high-quality products and services, which 
companies perform on the domestic and the international markets. Despite the high significance 
of the coefficients, the fit for the international markets (coefficient (.843) is 1.6 times higher the 
fit for the domestic market (coefficient (.528).  
Comparable correspondence emerges between the fit among the capabilities for software 
programming and the skills for prompt delivery, which companies execute on the domestic and 
international markets. Notwithstanding the high significance of both coefficients, the fit between 
the capabilities, which companies achieve so to compete on the international markets 
(correlation coefficient (.844) is 1.7 times higher the fit, which companies achieve, when 
competing on the domestic market (coefficient (.493). 
Similarly, capabilities for prompt delivery appear to be strongly coupled with the capabilities for 
producing high quality products and services. A strong fit between them occurs, when 
performed on the domestic and the international markets, and yet the fit on the international 
markets (coefficient (.817) is 1.7 times higher than the fit on the domestic market (coefficient 
(.468). 
7.2.2 Technological capabilities with low level of coherence 
The differences in the fit of the domestic vs. the export technological capabilities begin to 
emerge, when comparing the following pair of capabilities. The fit between the capabilities for 
software design and the capabilities to master specialised expertise in a particular domain, 
which companies perform on the domestic market, is with a correlation coefficient (.394). 
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Despite being significant at .05 level, this fit is 2 times lower then the fit, which companies 
perform between the capabilities for software design and the capabilities to master specialised 
expertise in a particular domain, when competing on the international markets (correlation 
coefficient (.796). The fit between these capabilities on the domestic market is less tight than the 
fit on the international markets. Apparently, when operating on the international markets, the 
companies find it mandatory to develop excellence in both capabilities and to align them to a 
great extent, while for companies operating on the domestic market this is less the case.  
Overall, in all cases above a clear fit occurs among the capabilities, which companies achieve on 
the international and the domestic market, although the fit of the capabilities on the domestic 
market appears to be a bit lower although significant.   
However, this tendency is not sustained throughout all capabilities. In the rest of the cases the 
disparity between the fit of the domestic vs. the export technological capabilities emerges 
clearly.  
Notwithstanding the different levels, the fit among the capabilities for software design and the 
capabilities to maintain expertise in a particular domain exists, as shown above. Whereas in the 
case of capabilities for software programming and the capabilities to master expertise in a 
particular domain a wider disparity in the fit emerges. When performing on the international 
markets, companies find it compulsory to develop excellence in both capabilities and to align 
them to a great extent (correlation coefficient (.779), whereas this appears not to be the case for 
companies operating on the domestic market (coefficient (.246). Apparently, developing 
specialised expertise in a particular domain is not necessarily coupled with excellent capabilities 
for software programming, when companies are to perform on the domestic market.  
Similar disparity appears with respect to the fit among the ‘export’ vs. the ‘domestic’ 
capabilities for software design and the capabilities to offer high quality products and services. 
While the fit amongst them is highly significant when companies perform on the international 
markets (correlation coefficient (.800), the fit among these is rather low when companies 
operate on the domestic market (correlation coefficient (.325). It is striking that companies may 
operate without having aligned their basic technical capabilities, like capabilities for software 
design, with their capabilities to offer high quality products and services. This discrepancy 
appears to hold only on the domestic market and it serves to indirectly indicate that the domestic 
market maintains lower technological sophistication in comparison to the international markets. 
Even greater divergence appears in the fit among the ‘export’ vs. the ‘domestic’ capabilities for 
software design and the capabilities for prompt delivery. The capabilities for software design 
and the capabilities for prompt delivery, which companies execute on the international markets, 
appear to reveal a strong fit (with correlation coefficient (.848), whereas a fit amongst these 
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capabilities, when deployed on the domestic market, is non-existent (correlation coefficient 
(.189). The analysis of the individual capabilities revealed that prompt delivery does not appear 
to be a strong capability on the domestic market. Furthermore, at this point the analysis reveals 
that companies do not find it necessary to align their capabilities for software design with their 
abilities to deliver on time, when performing on domestic market, while for the export markets 
the strong fit between the two appears to be a must. 
The strongest disparity between the ‘domestic’ and the ‘export’ technological capabilities 
emerges in the fit between companies’ capabilities to diversify their products and services and 
the rest of the capabilities in the set. The ability to diversify appears to be unrelated to 
companies’ export intensity (this is the only capability in the set, which is not positively 
correlated to the export intensity). But interestingly enough, a strong positive correlation 
appears between the capability to diversify and all the rest capabilities in the set, when these are 
deployed on the international markets. In other words, companies appear to diversify their 
products and services both on the domestic and the international markets, but it is only the 
exporters who appear to make a deliberate effort to develop a strong fit between the excellence 
in diversification and the rest of the capabilities. The exporters reveal a strong fit among the 
capabilities to diversify and the rest of the capabilities in the set, and this holds for all 
capabilities in the set. Whereas no such fit occurs when diversification skills are deployed with 
the rest of the capabilities on the domestic market.  
In order to compete on the international markets companies find it necessary to develop a strong 
fit between their capabilities for software design and the capabilities to diversify products and 
services (coefficient (.691), while this is not the case, when deploying the same capabilities on 
the domestic market (coefficient (.122). 
Similarly, when competing on the international markets companies perform a strong fit between 
their capabilities for software programming and the capabilities to diversify products and 
services (coefficient (.736), while this is not at all the case, when deploying the same 
capabilities on the domestic market (coefficient (020). 
The same pattern persists with the rest of the capabilities in the set. Executing international 
projects companies perform equally strongly their diversification skills and their capabilities for 
producing high quality software (coefficient (.742), while no such alignment occurs in 
companies’ performance on the domestic market (coefficient (.267). 
Similarly, offering diversified products and services on the international markets is coupled with 
their prompt delivery (coefficient (.702), while similar coupling does not occur at all on the 
domestic market (coefficient (.026). 
 46 
Producing diversified products and services on the international markets is strongly coupled 
with having specialised expertise in a particular area (coefficient (.685), whereas this does not 
hold for the domestic market (coefficient (.258). 
7.3 Conclusions about the degree of coherence of export vs. domestic technological 
capabilities 
Perhaps the most important and striking point, which emerges out of the analysis, is that very 
high level of coherence occurs among all capabilities, when they are deployed on the 
international markets. Not even a single exception of low or medium high level of coherence 
exists in the case of the export technological capabilities. It is striking that although capabilities 
for diversification do not appear to be correlated with the export intensity, i.e. exporters do not 
necessarily have greater diversified range of products and services they offer, the skills for 
diversification do appear to be highly correlated with the rest of the capabilities, when they are 
deployed on the international markets. This by itself is revealing of how tight must be the fit 
among all capabilities to enable latecomer software companies to compete internationally. 
While operating on the domestic market, the companies appear to perform a high degree of 
coherence among some capabilities, representing a half of the whole set of capabilities, and yet 
the level of coherence appears to be lower than the level of coherence of the same capabilities 
deployed on the international markets. But in the other half of the cases, the companies perform 
a low level of coherence among the capabilities in the set. Apparently, when deploying their 
technological capabilities on the domestic market, the software companies do not find it 
necessary to develop a strong level of coherence among all technological capabilities. 
Respectively, this suggests that the demand in the domestic market is relatively unsophisticated 
and allows companies to serve customers without performing a tight fit among all technological 
capabilities. 
The strongest divergence between the domestic vs. the export technological capabilities emerges 
in the fit among the capabilities for diversification of products and services and the rest of the 
capabilities. Unlike the case of the export technological capabilities, where a high level of 
coherence emerges between the capabilities to diversify and the rest of the capabilities, the same 
tendency does not occur in the case of domestic technological capabilities. Despite the fact that 
most of the companies, operating on the domestic market reveal high degree of diversification 
of the products and services they offer, the level of coherence between the capabilities to 
diversify and the rest of the capabilities is very low in absolutely all cases. This perhaps is 
coming to suggest that a strategy of diversification on the domestic market is more likely to be 
an ad hoc strategy of utilising all available opportunities rather than a deliberate attempt to 
broaden companies’ knowledge base and align it with the rest of companies’ technological 
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capabilities. This comes as another piece of evidence about the relatively unsophisticated 
demand on the domestic market, which allows companies to provide a range of software 
services without necessarily ensuring a strong fit between these and the rest of the technological 
capabilities. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
The paper makes a number of contributions. First, it makes an attempt to examine 
systematically the types of capabilities, which the latecomer software companies need to 
develop, if they are to develop internationally competitive software industries based on 
indigenous resources. Second, it introduces the notion of coherence of technological 
capabilities. It emphasises that if we are to make a comprehensive account, in analysing the 
accumulation of technological capabilities we need to investigate the degree of coherence 
among the constituent capabilities. The degree of coherence depicts the deeper structures in the 
process of the technological capabilities building. Successful technological building requires not 
only accumulation of individual capabilities but it also necessitates development of high degree 
of coherence among the capabilities. Third, it brings back the debate about development of 
indigenous software industries by the latecomers. 
As the case of the Bulgarian software industry reveals, the accumulation of individual 
capabilities to perform on international markets appears to be a difficult task. The demand on 
the domestic market is technologically less sophisticated and the companies find the shift to 
international markets difficult, even when they had already developed excellent capabilities to 
perform on the domestic market. Due to the low performance requirements on the domestic 
market the latecomer companies do not find it necessary to develop high degree of coherence 
among the capabilities in the set, when performing on the local market. This appears detrimental 
to their attempts to develop capabilities to compete on the international markets.  
This is a revealing case that building technological capabilities in the latecomer software 
industry is indeed a cumbersome task. The latecomer companies need not only to accumulate a 
set of separate individual capabilities, but more so to build a strong level of coherence among 
them. This seems to be the major distinction between the technological capabilities, which are 
deployed on the domestic vs. the international markets.  
These results contest the ‘walking on two legs’ proposition, suggesting that the latecomer 
software companies need to pay more attention to the domestic opportunities because of their 
high returns in terms of gaining experience and innovation in software production and providing 
training opportunities that allow a broadening of software exports (Schware, 1992). The case of 
Bulgaria, and most of the latecomer countries, shows that technological development in the 
domestic market does offer learning opportunities for software production and yet they remain 
far away from the frontier developments and do not enable the latecomer software companies to 
enter the international arena. 
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This point bring us back to the argument of Steinmueller (2001) about the possibilities for 
leapfrogging by the developing countries, where the discussion is centered on an optimistic 
perspective about the possibilities for production and use of information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) by the developing countries, and the software and information services in 
particular are outlined as one of the prospective areas for technological leapfrogging. The author 
emphasises that to be able to embark on a leapfrogging trajectory the latecomer companies need 
to develop ‘absorptive capacities’ to acquire expertise to produce and use the ICTs 
(Steinmueller, 2001, p. 197). 
The results of our analysis reveal that a modest number of Bulgarian software companies have 
been able to build technological capabilities to compete on the international markets, whereas 
the predominant number of the companies acknowledges that the capabilities, which they have 
accumulated, are insufficient to allow them to compete in the global arena. Furthermore, the 
analysis reveals that the companies, which serve the domestic market and represent the 
predominant part of the industry, have not been able to develop a high level of coherence among 
the capabilities they master, despite their success to develop very good expertise in the 
individual capabilities.  
All these suggest that developing absorptive capacities remains a challenge for the latecomer 
companies. Therefore the optimistic forecasts about the possibilities for leapfrogging by the 
latecomer countries by developing indigenous software industries have been overestimated. This 
is not to contest the optimism about the potential of the latecomer companies to develop mastery 
over new technologies and eventually to generate new technologies, but rather to suggest that it 
is most likely that a limited number of latecomer companies will be able to develop leading-
edge capabilities. Perhaps latecomer countries like India, China and Brazil, which have been 
able to mobilise their potential in harnessing the benefits from the ICTs, present optimistic 
examples (despite the fact that the software industries in China and Brazil remain predominantly 
domestic-market oriented, the domestic demand is sophisticated, as it is represented by MNEs). 
Whether other cases would provide grounds for optimism or rather the experience of the rest of 
the latecomers would provide evidence for a counter argument, is still to be seen. The case of 
the Bulgarian software industry itself presents a case for moderate optimism. It is optimistic that 
a group of companies, although representing a relatively small share in the industry, has 
managed to enter and compete on the international markets. Nevertheless, the questions remain 
whether any of the domestic-oriented companies will be able to make a shift to the international 
markets and how sustainable the development of the domestic-oriented companies will be in the 
future.   
This paper needs to be complemented by further research in three directions. The first direction 
of research is to expand the framework of capabilities. In order to take a comprehensive account 
 51
of the capabilities, which the latecomer software companies need to muster, the proposed 
framework should be elaborated further to distinguish between technical and organisational 
capabilities, which is done in (Rousseva, 2006). Second, the analysis of the capabilities in this 
paper had been based predominantly on quantitative data. This has been done deliberately to 
emphasise the significant inter-group difference in the level of accumulation of technological 
capabilities and to reveal the different degree of coherence in capabilities. The analysis can be 
complemented by qualitative research to depict further details. Third, further research needs to 
be directed at investigating the learning process underlying the accumulation of different levels 
of technological capabilities, to disentangle the complexity of technological capabilities building 
in the latecomer context. In this part of the analysis it would be appealing to explore the impact 
of organisational capabilities in the process of technological capabilities building and whether 
organisational congruence foster development of technological capabilities with high level of 
coherence. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
 
Capabilities Mean Mode 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
Design capabilities for local market 4,86 5 0,351 0,058 
Design capabilities for international markets 2,84 3 1,305 0,212 
Programming capabilities for local market 4,92 5 0,273 0,044 
Programming capabilities for international  
markets 3,08 3 1,381 0,23 
High quality on local market 4,7 5 0,52 0,085 
High quality on international markets 3,42 5 1,519 0,253 
Prompt delivery on local market 4,53 5 0,971 0,162 
Prompt delivery on international markets 3,56 5 1,517 0,256 
Specialised expertise in domain in local 
market 4,41 5 0,956 0,157 
Specialised expertise in domain in 
international  markets 3,24 5 1,532 0,249 
Diversified products and services in local 
market 4,11 5 1,173 0,193 
Diversified products and services in 
international  markets 2,59 3 1,257 0,207 
 
Table 1. Accumulation of individual capabilities in the Bulgarian software companies 
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ANOVA
.226 1 .226 1.793 .190
4.038 32 .126
4.265 33
26.389 1 26.389 24.587 .000
34.346 32 1.073
60.735 33
.036 1 .036 .627 .434
1.846 32 .058
1.882 33
28.889 1 28.889 24.427 .000
37.846 32 1.183
66.735 33
.002 1 .002 .011 .917
6.615 32 .207
6.618 33
23.308 1 23.308 13.630 .001
54.721 32 1.710
78.029 33
.654 1 .654 .657 .424
31.846 32 .995
32.500 33
10.928 1 10.928 5.193 .029
67.337 32 2.104
78.265 33
.005 1 .005 .005 .943
31.760 32 .992
31.765 33
29.403 1 29.403 17.411 .000
54.038 32 1.689
83.441 33
2.851 1 2.851 2.576 .118
35.413 32 1.107
38.265 33
11.245 1 11.245 7.998 .008
44.990 32 1.406
56.235 33
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Design capabilities for
local market
Design capabilities for
international markets
Programming capabilities
for local market
Programming capabilities
for international  markets
High quality on local
market
High quality international
markets
Prompt delivery on local
market
Prompt delivery on
international markets
Specialised expertise in
domain in local market
Specialised expertise in
domain in international 
markets
Diversified
products&services in
local market
Diversified
products&services in int 
markets
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
 
 
Table 2. ANOVA analysis of differences between technological capabilities of domestic-
oriented vs. export-driven companies 
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Spearman's rho Correlations 
Dome
stic 
orient
ed 
Export 
driven 
Design C 
local 
market  
Design C 
international 
markets  
Programm
ing C 
local 
market  
Programm
ing C 
internatio
nal 
markets  
High 
quality 
local 
market  
High 
quality 
internation
al markets  
Prompt 
delivery 
local 
market  
Prompt 
delivery 
internatio
nal 
markets  
Specialised 
expertise in 
domain in 
local 
market 
Specialised 
expertise in 
domain 
international 
markets  
Diversified 
products 
&services 
local 
market  
Diversified 
products 
&services 
international 
markets  
Domestic 
oriented 
Coeffic
ient 1 
-
1.000(
**) 
-0.213 -.607(**) -0.15 -.640(**) -0.039 -.539(**) -0.015 -.404(*) -0.097 -.583(**) 0.153 -0.315 
Export driven Coefficient   1 0.213 .608(**) 0.124 .640(**) 0.008 .539(**) 0.015 .404(*) 0.109 .584(**) -0.182 0.316 
Design C local 
market  
Coeffic
ient     1 0.137 .604(**) -0.037 0.325 0.026 0.189 0.005 .394(*) 0.065 0.122 0.133 
Design C 
international 
markets  
Coeffic
ient       1 0.107 .842(**) 0.059 .800(**) -0.093 .848(**) -0.029 .796(**) -0.187 .691(**) 
Programming C 
local market  
Coeffic
ient         1 0.114 .528(**) 0.099 .493(**) 0.172 0.246 0.093 -0.02 0.159 
Programming C 
international 
markets  
Coeffic
ient           1 -0.003 .843(**) 0.068 .844(**) -0.018 .779(**) -0.314 .736(**) 
High quality 
local market  
Coeffic
ient             1 -0.13 .468(**) 0.067 .740(**) -0.182 0.267 0.112 
High quality 
international 
markets  
Coeffic
ient               1 -0.176 .817(**) -0.26 .909(**) -.392(*) .742(**) 
Prompt delivery 
local market  
Coeffic
ient                 1 0.029 .679(**) -0.228 0.026 0.145 
Prompt delivery 
international 
markets  
Coeffic
ient                   1 -0.084 .756(**) -.422(*) .702(**) 
Specialised 
expertise in 
domain in local 
market 
Coeffic
ient                     1 -0.307 0.258 0.037 
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Specialised 
expertise in 
domain 
international 
markets  
Coeffic
ient                       1 -.425(**) .685(**) 
Diversified 
products 
&services local 
market  
Coeffic
ient                         1 0.054 
Diversified 
products 
&services 
international 
markets  
Coeffic
ient                           1 
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). 
Table 3. Spearman’s correlation coefficients for the degree of coherence among domestic vs. export technological capabilities 
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